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For more than two hundred years, legal philosophers have been preoccupied with
specifying the differences between two systems of normative guidance that are
omnipresent in all modern human societies: law and morality. In the last hundred years,
what I will call the “Demarcation Problem”—the problem of how to distinguish these
two normative systems—has been the dominant problem in jurisprudence and legal
positivism has offered the most important solution. Positivists such as Kelsen, Hart, and
Raz claim that the legal validity of a norm can not depend on its being morally valid,
either in all or at least some possible legal systems (the range of the scope operator here
marks the distinction between “Hard” and “Soft” versions of positivism).
Kelsen tells us on the first page of the Pure Theory that the theory “attempts to
answer the question what and how the law is, not how it ought to be”1 and the second
chapter on “Law and Morals” sets out to establish that the “science of law”—the science
of the legal validity of norms—is not to be confused with “ethics,” the science of the
social norms denominated “moral” (59).

“[L]aw and morals” must be “recognized as

different kinds of normative systems” (62), Kelsen says, a difference he locates in the fact
*

This paper owes its existence to a conversation with Larry Laudan.
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that law involves “a socially organized coercive” sanction, while morals lacks such
sanctions, substituting “merely the approval of the norm-conforming and the disapproval
of the norm-opposing behavior” (62).
The first sentence of The Concept of Law states Hart‟s aim “to further the
understanding of law, coercion, and morality as different but related phenomena” (vi).
He famously identifies as one of the three main issues driving jurisprudential inquiry the
question, “How does legal obligation differ from, and how is it related to, moral
obligation?” (13). That issue looms so large because “law and morals share a vocabulary
so that there are both legal and moral obligations, duties, and rights” and “all legal
municipal legal systems reproduce the substance of certain fundamental moral
requirements” (7). This, of course, leads positivism‟s most important competitor, natural
law theory, to claim “that law is best understood as a „branch‟ of morality or justice.”
Positivists, of course, deny this. Finally, and as is well-known, Hart devotes an entire
chapter of The Concept of Law to the relationship between “Law and Morals,” noting that
positivists deny that “the criteria of legal validity of particular laws used in a legal system
must include, tacitly if not explicitly, a reference to morality or justice” (185) and that, in
consequence, “it is in no sense a necessary truth that laws reproduce or satisfy certain
demands of morality, though in fact they have often done so” (185-186).
Raz, similarly, devotes fully half of his classic collection of essays, The Authority
of Law, to “criticiz[ing] various attempts to establish a conceptual connection between
law and morality” (x) and the seminal chapter on “Legal Positivism and the Sources of
Law” makes clear that the identification of law “is a matter of social fact” that is
independent of its “moral merit” (37).
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If it is familiar and uncontroversial that the Demarcation Problem has been central
to legal philosophy, it perhaps requires more emphasis what kind of answer to the
Demaracation Problem jurisprudents have demanded. Hart himself says we want to
understand “the nature (or the essence) of law” (6). But what is it to understand the
nature or the essence of law? Julie Dickson, following Raz, says that,
A successful theory of law…is a theory which consists of propositions about the law
which (1) are necessarily true, and (2) adequately explain the nature of law….I am
using “the nature of law” to refer to those essential properties which a given set of
phenomena must exhibit in order to be law.2
She is echoed more recently by Scott Shapiro, who says that in inquiring into “the
fundamental nature of law” we want to “supply the set of properties that make (possible
or actual) instances of [law] the things that they are”3 and offers the example of water
being H2O: “Being H2O is what makes water water. With respect to law, accordingly,
to answer the question „What is law?‟ on this interpretation is to discover what makes all
and only instances of law instances of law and not something else.”4 In addition, says
Shapiro (here again echoing Dickson who is following Raz), “to discover the law‟s
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Julie Dickson, Evaluation and Legal Theory (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2001), p. 17. Dickson
faithfully follows Raz’s lead here, though he has not always been so immodest. Thus, in the earlier essay
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“Legal Positivism and the Sources of Law,” reprinted in his The Authority of Law, 2 ed. (Oxford: Oxford
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nature” is also “to discover its necessary properties, i.e., those properties that law could
not fail to have.”5
Legal philosophy has, unsurprisingly, always been hostage to its philosophical
climate—jurisprudents are rarely, if ever, innovators in philosophy. They, instead, are
the jurisprudential Owls of Minerva, bringing considered philosophical opinion in its
maturity (sometimes, alas, on its death bed) to bear on theoretical questions that arise
distinctively in the legal realm. Thus, Kelsen‟s jurisprudence bears the stamp of
NeoKantianism and the moral anti-realism common among logical positivists, while
Hart‟s jurisprudence reflects the methodological influence of ordinary language
philosophy and the substantive influence of post-World War II Oxford-style noncognitivism. Kelsen and Hart had the correct meta-ethical views, but did not, perhaps,
fully appreciate their import with respect to their central jurisprudential concerns. What
is particularly striking is that, even at the dawn of the 21st-century, legal philosophers set
conditions for a successful analysis of the Demarcation Problem—to identify the
“necessary” and “essential” properties of law that distinguish it from morality--that
would strike most philosophers in other fields, even thirty years ago, as wholly
incredible, even ludicrous. The persistence of the Demarcation Problem means the
jurisprudential Owl of Minerva has not yet taken flight. I hope here to set this venerable
philosophical bird on her path and to lay the Demarcation Problem to rest.
The concept of law is an “artifact concept,” that is, a concept that picks out a
phenomenon that owes its existence to human activities—it is, that is, an “artifact” of
those activities. Even John Finnis, our leading natural law theorist, does not deny this
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point.6 I certainly do not understand Kelsen, Hart, Raz, Dickson, or Shapiro to deny this
claim. Those who might want to deny that law is an artifact concept are not my concern
here; the extravagance of their metaphysical commitments would be subjects for
psychological, not philosophical investigation.
Artifact concepts, even simple ones like “chair,” are notoriously resistant to
analyses in terms of their essential attributes, precisely because they are hostage to human
ends and purposes, and thus can not be individuated by their natural properties—unlike
say natural phenomena like “water,” which just is H20. Chairs can be made of stone or
wood or metal. Their apparent function—providing support for those who sit—can be
discharged by boxes, tortoises, car seats, and steps. Moreover, some chairs have as their
actual function ornamental decoration, not sitting; some serve primarily as shelves for
stacking papers or books. Some chairs have arm rests, some do not; some have back
rests, some do not. Because human ends and purposes shift, the concept of a “chair” has
no essential attributes.
Now the question of whether an artifact concept has an extension that can be
picked out in terms of necessary and essential properties is not one unfamiliar to
twentieth-century philosophy: far from it. Karl Popper, Rudolf Carnap, and Carl
Hempel, to name three luminaries of 20th-century philosophy, were interested in a version
of the Demarcation Problem—not how to demarcate law from morality, to be sure, but
how to demarcate epistemically reliable forms of inquiry from epistemically unreliable
ones, that is, how to demarcate science from pseudo-science or nonsense. Like the legal
philosophers, they sought to identify the essential properties of a human artifact (namely,
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science). They failed, and spectacularly so. Perhaps there is a lesson for legal
philosophers in this story.
In philosophy of science, the Demarcation Problem was the problem of figuring
out which kinds of human inquiry were epistemically special, that is, which had
epistemic properties or characteristics that warranted the inference that the conclusions of
such inquiry were likely to be true. Those epistemically special forms of inquiry were to
be deemed scientific, and so deserving of credence, while all others were not. Permit me
to quote from Larry Laudan‟s seminal treatment of the rise and fall of the Demarcation
Problem,7 which he characterizes as follows:
[W]e expect a demarcation criterion to identify the epistemic or methodological
features which mark off scientific beliefs from unscientific ones. We want to
know what, if anything, is special about the knowledge claims and the modes of
inquiry of the sciences…[A]ny philosophically interesting demarcative device
must distinguish scientific and non-scientific matters in a way which exhibits a
surer epistemic warrant or evidential ground for science than non-science. If it
should happen that there is no such warrant, then the demarcation between
science and non-science would turn out to be of little or no philosophic
significance. (Laudan, p. 118)
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Attempts to solve the scientific Demarcation Problem were, in turn, precisely efforts to
specify the “conditions which are both necessary and sufficient” for some form of inquiry
to be scientific (Laudan, p. 119).
The history of the search for such a criterion is quite a long one, going back to
antiquity (though the artifact concept Aristotle wanted to understand is different than
ours, not surprisingly) (Laudan, pp. 112-113). In the 19th-century, there were attempts to
specify the distinctive “method” of scientific inquiry (Laudan, pp. 115-117), but the
solutions to the scientific Demarcation Problem most familiar to us now were those
associated with the Logical Positivists and Karl Popper. “Verificationist” theories held
that scientific propositions were genuinely meaningful, that is, empirically verifiable.
These theories, however, ran into trouble because, on the one hand, as Laudan observes,
“many statements in the sciences [are] not open to exhaustive verification (e.g., all
universal laws)” (p. 120), while many false statements—like “the Earth is flat”—are
verifiable (though false!) since “we can specify a class of possible observations which
would verify” the statement (p. 121). Popper‟s alternative, eschewing verification for
falsifiability, ran into different problems: it could not explain the scientific status of most
“singular existential statement[s]” (p. 121) (e.g., “there exists a Black Hole”) and it
deems “scientific” (and, ergo, epistemically reliable) “every crank claim which makes
ascertainably false assertions” (p. 121).8
As Laudan observes, we can not “prove that there is no conceivable philosophical
reconstruction of our intuitive distinction between the scientific and the non-scientific”
(or we might add, between the “legal” and the “moral”) (p. 124). But we can conclude,
8
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as Laudan does, that “none of the criteria which have been offered thus far promises to
explicate the distinction” (p. 124). We should, therefore, ask why solving the
Demarcation Problem matters? For what philosophical or practical purposes do we need
a solution to the Demarcation Problem?
In the case of science, the solution mattered for explicitly practical reasons. As
Laudan remarks, “demarcation criteria are typically used as machines du guerre in a
polemical battle between rival camps” (p. 119). So, for example, “Popper was out to
„get‟ Marx and Freud” (p 119) by showing that their theories were not falsifiable. It is
now notorious that Popper had no grasp of either Marx‟s or Freud‟s views,9 but that is not
a dispute we need to resolve here. What matters, as Laudan notes, is that,
the labeling of a certain activity as „scientific‟ or „unscientific‟ has social and political
ramifications which go well beyond the taxonomic task of sorting beliefs into two
piles….Precisely because a demarcation criterion will serve as a rationale for taking a
number of practical actions which may well have far-reaching moral, social and
economic consequences, it would be wise to insist that the arguments in favor of any
demarcation criterion we intend to take seriously should be especially compelling. (120)
In other words, the Demarcation Problem was thought to matter because knowledge
matters, because what we know affects what we think ought to be done. As Laudan
remarks, “It remains as important as it ever was to ask questions like: When is a claim
well confirmed? What can we regard a theory as well tested? What characterizes
cognitive progress?” (124). What the failure in philosophy of science to solve the
Demarcation Problem shows is that we can not take a shortcut to answers these questions
9

See generally, Brian Leiter, “The Hermeneutics of Suspicion: Recovering Marx, Nietzsche, and
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by simply dividing forms of inquiry into the “scientific” and “non-scientific” based on
some necessary and essential properties distinguishing the two forms of inquiry.
So what then about the Demarcation Problem in jurisprudence? I do not need to
rehearse for this audience the doubts about the positivist analysis of law, the most
powerful and successful analysis of law we have. Many of these doubts may be, as I am
inclined to think, misguided, yet who can deny that there are genuinely hard cases for the
positivist to explain? Hart says that the “necessary and sufficient conditions” for a legal
system require that citizens generally obey the valid primary rules and that the officials of
the system accept the secondary rules of the system from an “internal point of view,” that
is, they view them as imposing obligations upon them. Can there not then be a legal
system in which the officials are motivated by merely self-interested concerns, e.g., they
enforce the secondary rules because it advances their professional career or spares them
from political retribution? Can the idea of a rule of recognition really account for the
reasoning of common-law courts interpreting precedents? Hart says the “rule of
recognition” is merely a social rule, so its content is fixed by whatever the practice of
officials in a particular legal system happens to be. Raz says the practice can not include
appeal to moral criteria of legal validity consistent with the law‟s claim to authority.
Shapiro says it can not include such appeals consistent with the law‟s claim to guide
conduct. Waluchow argues the law‟s claim to authority is compatible with an official
practice of employing moral criteria of legal validity if authoritative directives are merely
weighty, rather than exclusionary, reasons for action. And so on.
If, in the history of philosophy, there is not a single successful analysis of the
“necessary” or “essential” properties of a human artifact, why should we think law will

9

be different? If hundreds, perhaps thousands, of philosophers in the last century--both
the innovators like Carnap and Popper, and the legions of less well-known philosophical
laborers—could not specify the essential and necessary features of science, perhaps the
most important and transformative human artifact of recorded history, should we really
hold out hope that an analysis of law will yield “necessary” and “essential” criteria?
A skeptical induction over past failure is not a conclusive refutation, just as the
failure to solve the Demarcation Problem in philosophy of science does not prove that
there is no account of the essential and necessary properties of an inquiry that is
scientific. But, rather than belabor the no-doubt familiar disputes about the Demarcation
Problem in jurisprudence, let us follow Laudan‟s lead and ask a different question:
namely, why does solving this problem matter?
In surveying the writings of the great writers on the Demarcation Problem in
jurisprudence—I here mean Kelsen, Hart, and Raz—it seems that two practical concerns
explain the importance for these writers, and those who follow them, of demarcating
legal from moral norms10:
(1) First, the fact that a norm is legally valid does not mean it is morally obligatory.
(2) Second, the fact that a decision by a legal official would be morally attractive
does not mean it is legally obligatory.
In other words, legal positivists—those who have insisted that the Demarcation Problem
can be solved—are keen to emphasize that legality does not entail morality and,
conversely, that morality does not entail legality. You will notice, of course, that the
10
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out what they take to be true of the concept of law. But since there is no reason to think this is a sensible
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congenial to their original ambitions--it is important to focus on its import for practical reasoning.
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need to draw this distinction, to solve the Demarcation Problem, turns on the assumption
that the moral validity of a norm entails a practical consequence, i.e., it entails acting in
accordance with the norm. If we grant that assumption, then confusing law and morality
has serious practical consequences indeed: it means that if the legal validity of a norm is
equivalent to its moral validity, then every law ought to be obeyed. And, conversely, it
means that if a norm is morally valid, then a legal actor ought to apply it.
The Demarcation Problem in philosophy of science was meant to solve a
normative problem about theoretical rationality, about what we ought to believe. But, as
Laudan correctly observed, its solution had consequences for practical reason, for what
ought to be done, and it was these that motivated the ultimately futile search for a
theoretical short-cut. The Demarcation Problem in jurisprudence also purports to resolve
a theoretical dilemma: what to believe about the nature of law. But the connection of an
answer to this question to matters of practical import is even more apparent. We can
perhaps defuse the Demarcation Problem in jurisprudence if we tackle its underlying
assumption: namely, that the moral validity of a norm is overriding in practical
reasoning.
Suppose it were agreed that the moral validity of a norm was not overriding in
practical reasoning. Suppose morally valid norms merely give defeasible (even easily
defeasible) reasons for acting, just like legally valid norms and norms of instrumental
rationality. That a norm was legally valid might, in some cases, also mean it is morally
valid, but what if that did not change one‟s reasoning about what ought to be done? That
a norm was morally valid might be an interesting fact for a judge to note, but it would not
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require from the judge one decision rather than another. In such a world, would solving
the Demarcation Problem in jurisprudence matter? It is hard to see why.
Kelsen and Hart, as everyone knows, were both metaphysical anti-realists about
moral norms: that is, they denied that such norms had any objective existence, they
denied that the best metaphysical account of what the world contains would include facts
about what is morally right and wrong. This might suggest that the normativity of
morals—its ability to give people reasons to act—should be understood in exclusively
psychological terms, i.e., as a fact about what particular people believe and feel when
they learn that, “It is morally wrong to do X” or “It is morally right to Y.” Hart, in fact,
accepted something like this view, since, unlike Kelsen, his was an “impure” theory of
law, in which anti-realism about norms was conjoined with non-cognitivism about the
semantics of normative judgment: to judge that doing X is morally (or legally) wrong is
just to express a certain kind of attitude or feeling, presumably one tied—
psychologically—to motivation and action.11 Insofar as Hart believed, quite reasonably,
that people thought moral rightness demanded action, he had good reason to worry about
the Demarcation Problem. The “purity” of Kelsen‟s theory—his reluctance to assimilate
the normativity of law to psycho-social facts about behavior and attitudes—might seem
to block the naturalization of the problem suggested by Hart‟s approach. I am afraid I am
with Hume, Nietzsche, and Hart in being skeptical that any sense can be given to the
NeoKantian idea of the grounds of intelligibility of the application of norms apart from a
psychological one. I am also fairly confident (contra Quine and his retrograde
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psychological behaviorism) that our best theory of the world will quantify over
psychological states and persons, but it will not quantify over moral norms,12 and so we
need to approach the Demarcation Problem in that spirit.
If we understand the idea of the morally obligatory or morally attractive in purely
psychologistic terms—which is precisely how Hart should (and perhaps does) understand
them—then the practical import of solving the Demarcation Problem changes. What is
legally valid is not morally obligatory, and what is morally attractive is not legal
obligatory: those are the two key contentions of proponents of the positivist answer to
the Demarcation Problem. But this only seems important to emphasize because people
actually think the moral is overriding in practical reasoning. In a world in which people,
for example, viewed moral obligation as on a par in practical reasoning with would feel
pleasant, it is hard to see why the Demarcation Problem would matter. Perhaps legal
norms are morally obligatory, but that does not answer the question what should be done.
And perhaps certain norms are morally attractive: that does not decide, at all, the
question whether a judge should apply them.
Admittedly, the world as the moral philosophers imagine it is one in which
morality is overriding in practical reason. We may bracket, for the moment, Nietzschean
and Thucydiean skepticism about whether this is the real world. The point that bears
emphasizing is that the solution to the Demarcation Problem is supposed to answer a
practical question about what ought to be done, one that is reducible to a psycho-social
question about the attitudes people have about morality and legality. Thus we may ask
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whether there is any reason to think a theoretical solution to the Demarcation Problem
will affect the actual psychological attitudes of persons?
Defenders of legal positivism, the dominant answer to the Demarcation Problem
in the last two hundred years, are surely familiar with the contention that a solution to the
Demarcation Problem has far-reaching consequences for practice. This was, after all, the
central thought behind Lon Fuller‟s famous 1957 attack on H.L.A. Hart,13 which has been
a target of philosophical derision ever since for its odd mischaracterizations of the claims
of legal positivists, including Hart. Fuller thought, simply put, that the blame for the
moral depravity of Nazi judges could be laid at the door of their “positivism,” i.e., their
view that they were bound to apply the legally valid norms of their immoral system (cf. p.
649). According to Fuller, positivism‟s “definitions of „what law really is‟ are not mere
images of some datum of experience, but direction posts for the application of human
energies” (p. 632) and he reminds us that “words have a powerful effect on human
attitudes” (p. 649). Thus, Fuller deems it worth asking “whether legal positivism, as
practiced and preached in Germany, had, or could have had, any causal connection with
Hitler‟s ascent to power” (p. 658) and concludes that, due to the ideas of legal positivism,
the “German lawyer was therefore peculiarly prepared to accept as „law‟ anything that
called itself by that name” (p. 659), even, of course, when the law was morally abhorrent.
Fuller‟s attack has been criticized for its misstatements of Hart‟s views, such as
claiming that Hart believes there is an “amoral datum called law, which has the peculiar
quality of creating a moral duty to obey it” (p. 656). That Hart‟s version of the positivist
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theory of law had none of the implications that Fuller claimed is not the issue.14 What
requires notice is that the main practical rationale for solving the Demarcation Problem
we have identified appears to be the mirror image of Fuller‟s attack on positivism:
namely, that the correct or incorrect view about legality will affect action! To be sure,
many legal philosophers might object that their only concern is a theoretical one, namely,
figuring out what is true about law. But we have never found any truths about any
artifact concepts that would satisfy the desiderata legal philosophers like Raz and
Dickson and Shapiro regularly announce, so it is hard to take seriously the idea that there
is a theoretical reason for solving the Demarcation Problem. That leaves us, then, only
with the practical reasons, and they are real enough, assuming one thinks that confusions
about morality and legality have consequences in political practice.
Let us suppose that they do, much as Fuller did. But why, then, think that a
jurisprudential solution to the Demarcation Problem would resolve them? That is the
key question. If I am right about the practical reason for solving the Demarcation
Problem in jurisprudence, then positivism is up against a psycho-social phenomenon:
people think that morally obligatory means overriding in practical reasoning, and they
think legally valid means morally obligatory. Does anyone seriously believe Kelsen‟s
Pure Theory of Law or Hart‟s The Concept of Law are the manifestos to counteract these
psycho-social phenomena? To think so would be to commit Fuller‟s mistake, but in
reverse. Fuller sought to lay at the door of Hart‟s positivism the reprehensible behavior
of Nazi legal officials. A positivist solution to the Demarcation Problem would, by
contrast, teach the Nazis that legal obligations are defeasible, since they are not moral
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obligations. (Should one really think that Nazi officials would have acknowledged the
force of moral norms that would defeat the legal ones?) If Fuller was mistaken, not only
in his characterization of positivism but in his claim that it had some “causal connection
with Hitler‟s ascent to power” (Fuller‟s words), then why should there be any practical
reason to try to solve the Demarcation Problem in jurisprudence?
Law and morality, as we noted at the start, are pervasive normative phenomena in
modern societies. We generally believe that judges have a defeasible obligation to apply
the law; we also generally believe that judges, like other persons, ought to do what is
morally right. These two normative demands can conflict, and then there can be a hard
practical questions to answer. The idea that a putative solution to the Demarcation
Problem gives us the answer—which seems to be what Fullerians and anti-Fullerians
think—is an illusion.
Even though we can not demarcate science and non-science, we still need to
assign degrees of epistemic credence to differing claims about what the world is like.
And even if we can not precisely demarcate law and morals, we still need to decide what
it is we ought to do, and what it is we have an obligation to do. Solutions to
Demarcation Problems, if they worked, would give us shortcuts. But if they do not work,
then we have to tackle the practical questions directly. In philosophy of science, that has
meant concentrated attention on the epistemology of the various sciences, from physics to
biology to psychology, and whether their distinctive claims are well-supported by the
available evidence. In philosophy of law that would mean focusing on particular legal
systems and the practical demands they make upon officials. To take a very American
example, the question is not whether the original public meaning of the Constitution is
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the criterion of legal validity in the U.S. legal system—as, for example, the far right
Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia believes—the question is whether applying the
original public meaning in resolving concrete controversies could be morally justified.
Even if Justice Scalia were right about the legal meaning of the Constitution, the right
conclusion might be that the legal meaning should be discounted.
Some might wonder whether this posture has brought me surprisingly close to the
position of Ronald Dworkin in his recent work.15 For has not Dworkin chastised legal
positivists for attempting to divorce legal philosophy from political philosophy, to
divorce questions about what the law is from questions about what it ought to be, and
what judges out to do? Indeed, he has, but for reasons wholly unrelated to the
considerations adduced here. Dworkin thinks that solving the Demarcation Problem
leads to answers to the practical questions, that the two kinds of questions stand and fall
together. Thus, Dworkin claims that the positivist solution to the Demarcation Problem
entails claims about how judges should decide cases--though as I, and others have noted,
this reading involves such a wild fabrication of the positivist position that Fuller looks
like an exemplar of interpretive charity by comparison.16 For positivists, the fact that a
norm is legally valid certainly creates a prima facie legal reason to decide in accordance
with the legal norm, but one that is defeasible by other equitable considerations. And,
conversely, Dworkin thinks his own theory of law as integrity both solves (or should we
say, “dissolves”) the Demarcation Problem and tells judges how to decide concrete cases.
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The skeptical argument developed here is different. It suggests we abandon the
Demarcation Problem in favor of arguing about what ought to be done, whether by
judges confronted with novel cases, or citizens confronted with morally objectionable
laws, on the grounds that human artifacts never admit of successful analysis in terms of
their essential characteristics—the lesson to be learned from twentieth-century
philosophy, especially philosophy of science. The lesson, frankly, seems well-confirmed
by the increasingly baroque attempts by legal positivists to solve the Demarcation
Problem after the valiant and seminal efforts of Kelsen, Hart, and Raz. And it seems
equally well-confirmed by the efforts of natural law theorists like John Finnis and Mark
Murphy, who really want theorists to focus on morally good law or practically
reasonable legal systems, but who insist on claiming that their transparent change of the
subject is really an answer to the Demarcation Problem, really a case of saying what
“non-defective” law is or what the “focal” cases of law are.17 The professionalization of
philosophy, including legal philosophy, guarantees, I fear, continued attention to the
Demarcation Problem, since specialization always run the risk of generating both an
audience and performers for ultimately pointless disputes. In the spirit of Marx‟s 2nd
Thesis on Feuerbach, let me suggest that a “dispute…that is isolated from practice is a
purely scholastic question.” I can see why Kelsen, Hart, and Raz might have thought that
a solution to the Demarcation Problem was both possible and might be relevant to
practice. I think we no longer have an excuse for believing this today.
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